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Quantification of historical sociological processes have recently gained attention among theoreticians in the
effort of providing a solid theoretical understanding of the behaviors and regularities present in sociopolitical
dynamics. Here we present a reliability theory of polity processes with emphases on individual political dynam-
ics of African countries. We found that the structural properties of polity failure rates successfully capture the
risk of political vulnerability and instabilities in which 87.50%, 75%, 71.43%, and 0% of the countries with
monotonically increasing, unimodal, U-shaped and monotonically decreasing polity failure rates, respectively,
have high level of state fragility indices. The quasi-U-shape relationship between average polity duration and
regime types corroborates historical precedents and explains the stability of the autocracies and democracies.
PACS numbers: 02.50.-r, 89.65.Cd, 89.65.Ef, 89.90.+n, 89.65.-s, 02.30.Zz
Beginning with the Berlin Conference in 1884 – leading to
the colonial despotism, to the National Conference of 1989
in Benin – marking the beginning of the democratic renewal,
Africa continues to experience various patterns of political-
economic regulations, mostly shifting away from autocratic
regimes and toward more open governance. The continent
has seen an increasing number of incomplete transitions to
democracy, resulting in a high vulnerability to outbreaks
of conflict [1–6]. Hypotheses for the proneness of the
continent to conflicts include the inherent contradictions of
being both partly open and repressive, the political incoheren-
cies associated with anocratic (semi-democratic) regimes,
economic underdevelopment, poor managerial styles, and
ethnic politics and polarization [7–15]. However, in the
past decades, there has been a fewer political instabilities
in anocratic regimes than predicted by historical data and
previous studies. Here we develop a simple model of polity
duration that explains historical data, and shows the risk of
polity change depends on the structural properties of polity
failure rates. Three cliophysical parameters [16] quantifying
the properties of the risk of political vulnerabilities are
estimated from the data, and are used to provide a scientific
understanding of the underlying mechanisms of regime
stability. We call this socio-political reliability theory, and
it has relevant implications for policy evaluations and designs.
Political processes within Africa have been character-
ized by waves of political instabilities, economic under-
performances and other social factors with more than half of
the sub-Saharan countries having experienced some forms of
state-formation and/or post-independence civil conflicts since
1960, making the continent a testbed for exploring the deter-
minants of political instabilities and state failures. As a result,
we have seen an upsurge of literature dealing with the causes
of civil wars and political unrests. Understanding the causes
and consequences of these civil conflicts have been a focus of
most of the recent social science research, particularly soci-
ological, political and economic inquiries with in-depth stud-
ies highlighting the role of economic under-development and
economic grievances in shaping risks of conflicts as illustrated
by the works of Auvinen [1], Hauge and Ellingsen [12], and
Collier et al. [5]; of monarchical tendency, oppression of
minority groups and repressive managerial styles of african
leaders as exemplified by the works of Francisco [9], Lich-
bach [17], and Moore [18]; of the ethno-linguistic and re-
ligious diversity, ethnic fractionalization, political polariza-
tion, favoritism and nepotism as identified by the works of
Ellingsen [7], Horowitz [15], Gurr [10], Lichbach [19] and
Vanhanen [20]; and comparatively, of the historical prece-
dents in the works of Bratton and van de Walle [2], Ellingsen
and Gleditsch [8], Hibbs [14], Huntington [6], and Muller
and Weede [21]. Some of these scholarly works have pro-
vided insights into the subtleties of socio-political processes
underlying the historical precedents and constraints affecting
the effectiveness of Africa’s political behaviors, and have re-
sulted in accumulation of empirical data and studies. De-
spite these accumulation of empirical knowledge, theoretical
contributions linking the polity dynamics, risk of political in-
stabilities, and scientific understanding of the processes have
been modest. In this paper, we provide quantitative evidence
linking the structural properties of polity failure rates to vari-
ations of political dynamics, finding substantial supports and
correlations between state fragility indices and the functional
shape of polity failure rates.
The model described herein links the levels of democracy,
polity durations and properties associated with the risk of
regime failure. To quantify the relationship between the polity
duration and regime type, we use the polity score from the
Polity IV data set [22], a scaled metric that measures regime
governance and the extent to which countries are democratic.
The score ranges between −10 for fully autocratic to 10 for
fully democratic, and was originally developed by Gurr and
colleagues [22, 23]. For our purpose, we map the polity score
from (−10, 10) to (0, 1). In this paper, we use polity
duration as a mean of assessing and measuring sociopolitical
reliability, dynamics of which are affected by various micro-
and macro-sociopolitical and economic processes. Possible
processes that might affect polity dynamics are the changes in
the governance and/or the structures of the government. This
could be peaceful or rebellious transition (e.g., coup d’ e´tats).
Another example in which polity dynamics can change is in
the managerial styles. That is, the adaptation of a larger policy
changes and international pressures can influence the dynam-
ics of polity. In other words, the government’s attempts to
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2minimize its probability of collapse or to maintain law and or-
der can result in movements towards a repressive or an expan-
sionary economic measure, and/or political repression or lib-
eration. This in turn leads to changes in the level of democracy
on the autocratic-democratic regime spectrum, and forces the
state to move towards harshly autocratic or open governance.
Therefore, polity change serves as an aggregative dynami-
cal quantity that can provide some insights into the macro-
sociopolitical behaviors originating from the complex inter-
actions between the economic, social and political dynamics
and domains. As a result, analyses presented herein focus on
the dynamics of polity and its duration.
Regime Type Mean Polity duration, 〈∆t〉 95% CI N
Autocracies 10.65 (9.75, 11.56) 164
Anocracies 5.04 (5.02, 5.07) 53
Democracies 10.20 (8.42, 11.99) 78
TABLE I: Empirical justification of average polity duration for dif-
ferent regime type from 1946-2008. rom the transformed polity
score, autocracy is a polity with a score in the range [0, 1/3], anoc-
racy within the range [1/3, 2/3], and democracy within the range [2/3,
1]
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FIG. 1: Level of democracy and polity durations. The figure shows
the average polity duration, 〈∆t〉 (years), with polities at either ends
having longer duration
Aggregating polity levels, we found that the average polity
durations for highly autocratic and institutionally consistent
democratic regimes are longer than the anocratic ones (e.g.,
see Table I), in which autocracies (e.g., scaled polity score
range = [0, 1/3]) are estimated to be slightly longer than
democracies in statistically insignificant way. However, fully
or harshly autocracies (e.g., scaled polity score = 0) have
shorter average polity duration than fully democracies (e.g.,
scaled polity score = 1). Table I summarizes our results.
Figure 1 shows an average duration as a function of scaled
polity score, in which anocratic regimes are highly unstable
with majority of the polities experiencing some regime change
within the first five years. The regime volatility is inversely
proportional to the average polity duration (e.g., Vr ∝ 1〈∆t〉 ).
That is, the shorter the polity duration, the higher the politi-
cal volatility and/or vulnerability to regime de-consolidation.
Our findings corroborate the fact that both fully autocratic and
democratic regimes are more durable and stable than anocratic
regimes, and have been supported by numerous political sci-
entists [17, 19, 20, 24–28]. However, we observed that ano-
cratic regimes have relatively experienced a fewer political in-
stabilities in the past decades than suggested by Table I and
fig. 1. To study the mechanisms that explain this, we look
at the cliometric space of the shape parameters characterizing
these polity failure rates to show that the structural properties
of the polity failure rates capture the risks of political instabil-
ities.
To explore the direct role of functional shape of polity fail-
ure rate in explaining the historical risk of conflict and polit-
ical instabilities, we use a modified Weibull function with a
dispersive scale parameter, σ > 0, and cliometric shape pa-
rameters α > 0 and β > 0 to characterize the distribution of
polity duration, ∆t:
S(∆t;σ, α, β) ∝
[
1− exp
(
−
[
∆t
σ
]α)]β
(1)
Fitting our model to Polity IV data set for forty-eight African
countries that have sufficient data points for our estimation
problem [22, 23, 29, 30], we can characterize the risk of
polity change by four regions (e.g., see fig. 2a) in the clio-
metric diagram of shape parameters α and β over which the
failure rate as a function polity duration is, respectively, in-
creasing (region I, e.g., Cp =
√
αβ ≥ 1 and α ≥ 1), de-
creasing (region II, e.g., Cp ≤ 1 and α ≤ 1), U-shaped or
bathtub-shaped (region III, e.g., Cp < 1 and α > 1), and
unimodal (region IV, e.g., Cp > 1 and α < 1). The Clio-
metric Number, Cp =
√
αβ is defined here as the geometric
mean of the two shape parameters, and measures the initial
growth of risk at the early stage of a new polity establishment.
Cp < 1 indicates an initial decay in the risk of polity change,
while Cp provides an indication of a possible increase in the
vulnerability of the polity. The cliometric shape parameter α
determines the monotonicity. That is, the polity failure rate
is monotone (α ≥ 1, Cp ≥ 1 or α < 1, Cp < 1) or non-
monotone (α > 1, Cp < 1 or α > 1, Cp < 1) if the direc-
tion of both α and Cp are the same or opposite, respectively.
The conditions above are based on the derivative of the fail-
ure rate, as defined by h(∆t;σ, α, β) = S
′(∆t;σ,α,β)
1−S(∆t;σ,α,β) . That
is, the analysis of h′(∆t;σ, α, β) or equivalently of the trans-
formation h ′(σ(log z)1/α;σ, α, β), where z = exp((∆t/σ)α)
determines the four distinct regions. Figure 2b show our
empirical summary for African continent. Interestingly, we
found that the majority of African countries have either U-
shape (29.2% or 14 countries) or uni-modal (50% or 24 coun-
tries) polity failure rates.
Bathtub-shaped or U -shaped polity failure rate suggests
that there is an initial period of high level of uncertainty and
civil unrest in a newly formed polity, followed by a long or
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FIG. 2: Properties of the polity failure rate or political hazard. The figures show: (a) functional type defining the risk of polity change
(failure or hazard rate) in α− β plane separated by the curves α∗ = 1 and C∗p =
√
αβ = 1; and (b) corresponding countries in Africa, as esti-
mated by our model using least absolute regression with Trust-Region and Levenberg-Marquardt algorithms whenever possible. Interestingly,
87.50%, 0%, 71.43%, and 75% of African countries in regions I, II, III and IV, respectively, have extremely high state fragility indexes (c).
short constant failure rate as dissidents abandoned or are in-
tegrated into the political system, and/or the government sat-
isfies the political demands of the dissidents. However, as
the loss of political legitimacy increases, the state effective-
ness decreases, and the lifetime of the polity is prolonged,
the risk of polity change is heightened due to cumulative
risks. Depending on the regime type, especially for anoc-
racies, this heightening of risk of polity change can easily
lead to political instability and civil unrest. For autocracies,
this implies the strengthening of repressive measures and in-
stitutions. Bathtub-shaped polity failure rate is reminiscent
of three fundamental mechanisms driving the risk of polity
change, namely the quality of governance, socio-political and
economic factors, and management styles. We found that
more than seventy percent (71.43%) of the countries with
bathtub-shape failure rates have extreme to serious level of
state fragility index (e.g., see fig. 2c), a measure of state ef-
fectiveness and legitimacy in the areas of security, economics,
development, and governance [22].
In contrast to U-shaped polity failure rate, we also observe
that other countries exhibit different functional properties in
which the risk of polity change initially starts low and in-
creases to a maximum, before decreasing with uni-modal fail-
ure rate. Twenty-four countries have failure rates exhibit-
ing uni-modal behaviors. Interestingly, seventy-five percent
(75%) of the countries with this property have high to se-
rious state fragility index. On the other hand, monotoni-
cally increasing and decreasing polity failure rates have fewer
countries with these risk structures. Monotonically increasing
polity hazard has the largest number of countries with more
than eighty-seven percents (87.50%) having high to serious
state fragility index (e.g., see fig. 2c). In contrast, countries
with the monotonically decreasing countries are the most sta-
ble with low state fragility index. Figure 3 illustrates com-
mon features in the structural property of polity failure rates
for eight different countries, irrespectively of the polity score.
The picture that emerges from our socio-political reliability
theory is that U-Shaped polity failure rate has both adaptation
and damage cumulative phases. The size and the magnitude
of each of these regions determine the nature of political in-
stability. That is, two or more countries can have similar fea-
tures of polity failure rates and still have different course of
socio-political instability depending on either the magnitude
of the risk (see figs. 3e-f ) and/or the size of certain region
(e.g., longer or shorter constant failure region; see figs. 3a-
b) in the case of bathtub shaped, the distance between the
peak of uni-modal failure rate and the y-axis (see figs. 3g-
h), convexity and concavity of monotonically increasing and
decreasing hazard rates (see figs. 3c-d). For instance, Angola,
Burkina Faso, Chad (e.g., see fig. 3a), Comoros, Djibouti,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia (e.g., see fig. 3b), Mau-
ritania, Morocco, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone are classi-
fied as having U -shaped risks of polity change. However, the
socio-political environments (e.g., level of political factional-
ism), economic conditions, and structural details are different.
Countries such as Burkina Faso, Comoros, Djibouti, Gabon,
Gambia, Morocco, and Mozambique, for example, shorter
left tail (decreasing failure rate) followed by a longer con-
stant failure than other countries within this cliometric space
of shape parameters ((see figs. 3a-b)). These properties con-
sistently capture most of the political behaviors in many of
these countries. Gambia with longer constant polity failure
rate, for example, had a democratic polity that lasted for forty
years before becoming an autocracy. Burkina Faso and Dji-
bouti on the other hand have started to carefully liberalize their
regimes. Other features of polity failure rates exhibit similar
sociopolitical interpretations supported by microscopic pro-
cesses. For instance, the socio-political conditions in Zim-
babwe (e.g., see fig. 3d) continue to deteriorate as illustrated
by monotonically increasing polity failure rates and as a re-
sult the risk of polity change continues to increase. On the
other hand, because of the longer constant rate region in the
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FIG. 3: Polity Failure Rates. The figures show different properties for polity failure rates using estimated parameters and data sampled from
eight different countries: (a) Chad with σc = 14.81, αc = 1.946, βc = 0.2602; (b) Gambia with σg = 20.9, αg = 10.22, βg = 0.05641;
(c) Libya with σl = 26.37, αl = 15.51, βl = 0.07682; (d) Zimbabwe with σz = 7.151, αz = 1.133, βz = 0.8861; (e) Tanzania with σt =
19.26, αt = 0.8893, βt = 1.06; (f) Madagascar with σm = 8.15, αm = 0.8063, βm = 0.9839; (g) South Africa with σsa = 3.11× 10−6,
αsa = 0.1042, βsa = 71.07; and (h) Guinea with σg = 0.9487, αg = 0.4285, βg = 11.04, respectively. These parameters were estimated
from empirical data using Least Absolute Regression method with Trust-Region and Levenberg-Marquardth algorithms, and were used to
generate the polity failure rates: (a-b) Chad and Gambia have U-shaped or bathtub-shaped with Chad having a shorter constant failure rate and
Gambia with shorter early life and longer constant polity failure rate before the increasing cumulative damage effect stage sets in; (c, d) Libya
and Zimbabwe exhibit, respectively, convex and concave monotonically increasing failure rates; in contrast, Madagascar (e) and Tanzania (f)
exhibit monotonically decreasing, and South Africa (g) and Guinea (h) have uni-modal polity failure rates, respectively.
5case of Libya, the sociopolitical condition is relatively stable
as compared to Zimbabwe (see figs. 3c-d)). In contrast, We
observed that countries with monotonically decreasing rates
have lower rate of political instability. The political condi-
tions in Madagascar and Tanzania have been relatively sta-
ble as captured by the monotone decrease in the polity failure
rate (e.g., see figs. 3e-f ). Interestingly, South Africa has uni-
modal polity failure rate. However, its functional signature is
closely similar to that of monotonically decreasing failure rate
with a steep initial increase. In the period leading to the un-
banning of the ANC, the release of Nelson Mandela, and the
repeal of apartheid policy, there was heightening risk of pos-
sible political unrests and changes leading to policies similar
to the redistributive policies that were adopted by Zimbabwe
after its independence. However, South Africa has been rela-
tively stable since the apartheid era.
In conclusion, we find that the shift away from autocratic
forms of governance in Africa provides strong evidence of the
relationships between political violence and instability and
democratization; and structural properties of the polity failure
rates provide a mean to characterizing the risk of political in-
stability in African countries, and other developing countries.
Future research could illustrate whether greater understanding
of the instantaneous behaviors of polity change coupled with
regime type and other socio-political and economic factors
can be used to design preventive and effective policies and/or
mitigate political instability. An extension of our model using
repairable system reliability theory with decision models may
allow us to develop effective policies that minimize the cost
of de-consolidating political institutions and the heightening
risks of state failure, civil conflict and unrest.
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